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I Introduction 
Many decisions which affect the economic well-being of 
large numbers of people are made by relatively small committees of 
selected representatives. Examples include rate-setting by various 
regulatory bodies, minimum wage laws and taxation policy. These 
few people in positions of responsibility are then the natural 
targets of organizations engaged in lobbying either for or against 
a particular measure. In this paper, I attempt to model this 
phenomenon under alternative assumptions regarding the existence 
of an effective counterlobby. I consider first the case where 
there is no organized opposition, using an optimal control approach. 
Then I extend the model to include an active counterlobby, using 
a game theoretic analysis. 
I make no particular assumptions regarding the nature of 
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lobbying behavior. It may consist of information provision, campaign 
contributions or other compensation. I merely assume that lobbying 
effort can influence a particular committee member's beliefs and can 
(stochastically) elicit commitment from that member to the lobbyist's 
cause. While the committee member chooses whether or not to commit 
himself, I assume that, as far as the lobbyist is concerned, commitment 
is probabilistic. I assume that, once committed, the committee member 
cannot become uncommitted. For example, commitment may consist of 
making a public statement in support of the lobbyist's cause; I 
then assume that it would be politically inexpedient to renege. 
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While it makes l.ittle difference whether I denominate the 
value of the target's commitment in terms of utility to the lobbyist 
or in terms of expected profit, in light of the professionalism of 
most lobbying groups and the prevalence of contract lobbyists, 
I· assume that the value of a particular committee member's 
commitment can be summarized in dollar terms. Then I propose expected 
profit maximization as the lobbyist's goal. 
II Lobbying Against Disorganized Opposition 
Consider first the case wherein the lobbying organization 
attempts to effect passage of a particular measure against disor-
ganized opposition. By disorganized opposition I mean that no 
counterlobby exists. While this covers by no means all cases, it is 
representative of many. For example, most special interest lobbying 
is against disorganized opposition, for the losses are often diffused 
over a large population while the benefits accrue to a relative few, 
Even a small cost to organizing may preclude the formation of an 
effective counterlobby. Although there is no established opposition 
lobby, there may be a certain inertial force working against the 
measure which can be countered by lobbying effort. We refer to 
the lobbying organization or its paid representative as the lobbyist, 
The person or group being lobbied is the target, 
The problem can be posed as one of optimal control. The 
control variable for the lobbyist is the rate of expenditure on lobbying 
until the date of the scheduled vote, If commitment is not obtained 
before the date of the vote, then the target is assumed to vote 
for the lobbyist's cause with some probability, which may depend 
on accumulated lobbying effort. 
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T denotes the scheduled date of the vote or decision. With 
initial date O, the planning horizon then becomes [O,T], The rate 
of lobbying expenditure at t is u(t). We assume that u(t) is 
nonnegative and belongs to some set of admissible controls, U. 
Since we will not be concerned explicitly with the circumstances 
under which optimal controls exist, we leave the set of admissible 
controls unspecified for now. 
The expenditure level u(t) is assumed to create a stock 
of accumulated lobbying effort.: z ( t) is accumulated lobbying effort 
at t. It is increased by lobbying expenditure u(t) via the production 
function 
z(t) g(u(t) ,z(t)) 
starting from some initial stock z(O) = z0 _:. 0, We assume that
g(u,z) _:. 0 and g(O,z) = 0 V z. That is, nonnegative lobbying 
expenditures produce nonnegative increments to z, but no free increments 
can be had. There is no exogenous growth or decay in accumulated 
lobbying effort. 2 2 We add that g(u,z) is C on :JR+ with g1 > O, g11
< 0 .: decreasing returns to lobbying expenditure , 
If we choose as our admissible set 
u {u(t): u(t) _:. 0, u(t) continuous, Vt E [O,T]} 
2 + then g(u(t),z) is continuous in t and C in z on [O,T] X:R and the 
differential equation 
g(u(t) ,z) 
with initial condition z(O) = z > 0 has a unique c1 solution z(t) o-
through z0, for any u(t) E U. 
Whether or not the target commits itself to vote for the 
lobbyist's cause depends upon how much sympathy the target has for 
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that cause. I assume that lobbying effort can enhance that sympathy, 
perhaps only stochastically. Since the lobbyist really can't tell 
how sympathetic the target is, or exactly how its lobbying effort 
affects this sympathy, I assume that it must rely on its subjective 
assessments of target behavior. I assume that the lobbyist's 
beliefs regarding how much accumulated lobbying effort is required 
(to stimulate sufficient sympathy) to elicit commitment are summarized 
in the subjective probability distribution 
F(z) _ Pr {target connnits with accumulated lobbying effort < z} . 
This need not be a proper distribution. That is, there may be a 
nonzero probability that no finite amount of accumulated lobbying 
effort is sufficient to induce a target to commit itself. 
Since z(t) is nondecreasing, this induces a distribution 
over the random date of commitment, T: 
PrfT < t} F(z(t)), t E [O  ,T].
Denote the value of the target's connnitment by P. This value is 
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independent of when commitment is obtained (so long as it is obtained 
by or at T), since the measure will not take effect until T. For 
example, if the measure will result in some positive wealth transfer 
to the members of the lobbying organization, then P denotes the 
present value of the wealth transfer (if the target is the sole 
decision-maker) or some expected value weighted by the degree of 
influence of the target over the decision. 
The rate used to discount the stream of future lobbying 
expenditures will be r. If no commitment is obtained by T, there 
remains a probability that the target will vote in the lobbyist's 
favor. Denote this probability, which may depend on accumulated 
lobbying effort, by p(z(T)), 
We can formulate the lobbyist's payoff as follows: 
J(u) JT -rt PF(z(T)) + Pp(z(T))(l - F(z(T))) - O e (1 - F(z(t)))u(t)dt. 
(1) 
That is, the lobbyist receives the value P if either a) 
it obtains the target's commitment by T, which occurs with probability 
F(z(T)); or b) it fails to obtain commitment by T, but the target 
votes or decides in favor of the lobbyist at T. This occurs with 
probability (1 - F(z(T)))p(z(T)). 
Expenditures u(t) are made only until commitment is obtained, 
due to the irrevocability a.ssumption. Thus costs accrue at the 
(expected) rate of (1 - F(z(t)))u(t) and are discounted at the 
rate r. 
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The lobbyist's goal, then, is to choose a lobbying expenditure 
path u(t) so as to maximize expression (1) subject to the constraints 
;(t) = g(u,z), z(O) 
u(t) admissible 
z > 0 o-
Proposition 1: Suppose F(z) has a nonnegative density, g2 .'.':_ 0 and 
g12.:::_ 0. If u*(t) exists, is positive, and is differentiable 
Vt E [O,T], then 
u*(t) is an increasing function of t. 
Remark: We are concerned only with those cases where commitment has 
(2) 
not yet been obtained (F(z(t)) < 1). If commitment has been obtained, 
then u*(t) = 0 V t after the commitment date. 
Proof: The Hamiltonian is 
H -e-rt(l - F(z))u + q(t)g(u,z) 
where q(t) is the costate variable. If u*(t) exists, it must 
satisfy the usual conditions for optimality: 
-rt -e (1 - F(z)) + q(t) g1(u*,z) 0, 
. -rt q = -e F' (z)u* - qg2(u* ,z), 
d q(T) = a; [PF(z(T)) + Pp(z(T))(l - F(z(T)))). 
(3) 
(4) 
Solving equation (3) for q(t) yields 
q (t) 
ertcl - F(z)) 
gl(ut,z)
Differentiating (5) and �quating the resulting expression for q 
to that of equation (4) yields the following: 
(1 - F)g u* 11 
Since g11 < 0 and 1 - F > 0, s gn u = -sgn [F1g1(u*gl - g)
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(S) 
+ (1 - F)(g1g2 - rg1 - gg12)J . Since g(O,z) = 0 and g(u,z) is strictly 
concave in u for fixed z, [g1u* - g) < O. Assuming g2 .'.':_ 0 and g12 .:'.:_ 0 
implies that the second term is also negative. Thus u*(t) is 
strictly increasing. Consider the restrictions g2 .'.':_ O, g12 .:::_ 0. They 
imply that it becomes no easier to create additional lobbying effort 
as z increases (and if it becomes more difficult, it does so at an 
increasing rate). In particular, what this rules out is a phenomenon 
akin to "learning by doing. " That is, the more effort accumulated, 
the more productive is current expenditure. If we allow this 
phenomenon, then we are unable to determine sgn u* unambiguously. 
With learning by doing, the lobbyist may be able to decrease expen-
ditures as time passes since these expenditures become more and more 
productive. 
In order to make any statements regarding the dependence of 
the optimal lobbying path on the various parameters of the model, we 
would need to examine a particular example. This is done in the 
9 
next section, 
III Example for the Unopposed Lobbyist 
Consider the expression h(z) = F'(z)/(l - F(z)), Then 
h(z) Pr {commitment occurs in (z,z+dz)jcommitment occurs after z} 
We can argue almost equally convincingly for h'(z) � O and h'(z) < O.
If h'(z) > 0, then imminent commitment becomes more and 
more likely as accumulated lobbying effort increases (given that 
commitment has not yet been obtained). If h1(z) < O, then the lobbyist 
becomes increasingly convinced that commitment is still a long way 
off (given that commitment has not yet been obtained). We will assume 
the intermediate case of h'(z) = O. That is, the lobbyist believes 
that each increment to accumulated effort is equally likely to elicit 
commitment (given no prior commitment). This corresponds to the 
d -Az + istribution F(z) = 1 - e , A E JR . In addition, we assume that 
1) g(u,z) = uY, y E (0,1) 
2) p(z(T)) = p, p E (O,l]. 
We will find it convenient to use a dynamic programming 
approach to solve the example. Define the value function 
V(t,z) maximum 
u E U 
subject to z uY, z(O) = O. 
The Bellman equation of dynamic programming is 
0 Vt + max u(t) 
The maximizing rate of lobbying expenditure in feedback 
form is 
1 
[ V rt Az1
1-y 
y ze e , 
The Hamilton-Jacobi equation 
1 1 1 
0 Vt + Vz
y-1 (erteAZ)l-y yl-y 
with terminal conditions 
V(T,z(T)) 
has solution 
V(t,z) 
P + P(p - l)e-Az(T) 
P + [P(p - l)]-«
 + (-Ay)a+l � 
-r I rat ra e a -Az raT) 1 -l e 
where a = �1
Y . Since V(t,z) is -y 
c1 and since V(t,z) and 
0 u [AV erte z]l
/1(1-A) solve 
z 
(6) and (8), 
u*(t) 
1 
rt AZ 1-y [yVz(t,z)e e J 
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(6) 
(1) 
(8) 
is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies [Stalford· and Leitmann 
(1973, Theorem 1)). 
For simplicity, consider the case y 1/2. Then [ 2P(l - p);\ert ] 2 u*(t) = _____;;;�Z�( -rt -rT • 4 - P(l - p);\ e - e ) r 
and the value of lobbying is 
V(O,O) - Pp 
2 2 (1 - erT) 1 - P(l - p);\ y r 
> o. 
(We subtract Pp since this is the expected payoff without lobbying), 
For any p < 1, it pays to invest in lobbying at a positive rate. 
The following proposition summarizes the comparative 
dynamics results. 
Proposition 2: For p < 1, 
au* i) ap- > 0 V t E [O,T). 
ii) Clu* 0 V t E [O,T). -- < Clp 
iii) Clu* 0 V t E [O,T], --< ClT 
iv) Clu* > ax-< 0 as t 
� 1 { rT > t = - ln e 
< r 
4r 
P(l -
v) Clu* > --0 as t Clr < 
> -< t, where t solves 
4T + P(l -r
p);\
2 [ert(t - T) 
p);\2} 
(ert _ erT)] 
= 0, r 
11 12 
The proof of proposition 2, largely algebraic, is contained 
in the Appendix. 
These results are readily interpretable. As we would 
expect, an increase in the value of commitment P stimulates an increase 
in the rate of lobbying expenditures over the entire planning horizon. 
An increase in p, the probability of a favorable vote at 
T (given no prior commitment), results in a uniformly lower rate of 
investment in lobbying. This is reasonable since it is then less 
imperative that commitment be obtained before T, If the scheduled 
vote date T is pushed further into the future, then lobbying is 
pursued at a lower rate over the longer horizon, due to the concavity 
of the effort production function. Notice thati:t in part (iv) may be 
negative. If so, Clu* then ax-> 0 V t E [O,T], But if t > O, then 
an increase in ;\ results in a reallocation of resources away from the 
relatively near future and toward the relatively distant future. A 
similar redistribution of expenditure is implied by an increase in the 
discount rate r. 
IV Lobbying Against Organized Opposition 
Consider now the case where there is an active counterlobby, 
I model this counterlobby's goal as the maintenance of the status 
quo, while the lobby's goal is passage of a measure which changes the 
existing statutes, presumably to the benefit of the members of the 
lobbying organization. Now the lobbyist must take cognizance of the 
fact that the counterlobby will react to the lobbyist's actions and 
vice versa. I model this case as a dynamic game under the presumption 
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that lobbying behavior is r.elatively easy to monitor due to disclosure 
laws and scrutiny by the press and various ethics and self-policing 
committees. Label the lobbyist player 1 and the counterlobbyist 
player 2. Again I assume that the target is a passive player in the 
game, being influenced in a systematic way by the efforts of the 
lobbyist and the counterlobbyist. 
Now the target has 3 options. It may commit itself to 
the lobby, to the counterlobby, or to neither, Both lobby and 
counterlobby then attempt to influence the target so as to obtain 
a commitment for their particular side of the issue. 
We modify our notation to include the counterlobby. Let 
zi(t) be player i's level of accumulated lobbying effort; player i can
add to zi(t) by spending money on lobbying: 
where ui is player i's rate of lobbying expenditure. I again assume 
that there are decreasing returns (gi > O,gii < O) and that there is
i no exogenous growth or decay in effort: g (O,zi) = O. 
Since we will not be explicitly concerned with existence 
problems, we take as i's strategy space, Ui' any set of reasonably nice 
functions of (t,z). For example, 
{ui(t,z): ui(t,z) � 0 and ui(t,z) is continuous in 
(t,z) and bounded and Lipschitz in z, 
2 \f (t,z) E [O, T] X JR+}.
Then the system 
0 
0 
1 has a unique C solution for every pair (u1,u2) E u1 X u2. That is,
we are looking for a solution in decision rules (or closed-loop 
strategies). 
14 
I assume that the level of player i's accumulated lobbying 
effort required to elicit commitment to player i's cause is stochastic 
with distribution Fi(z). (Both players have the same subjective 
probability distribution functions F1,F2). Clearly the target 
can commit its vote to only one side.: onee committed, the game 
is over as far as that particular target is concerned. 
Retain T as the scheduled date of the vote or decision, 
Again, let P(z1(T),z2(T)) be the probability that the target votes 
in support of player 1 at T (given that it has remained uncommitted 
until that time). Let P1 be the present value of the gain to player 
1 (and P2 the present value of the loss to player 2) if the target 
commits itself to vote for the measure. If the target commits 
itself to player 21s side, then both sides receive a payoff of zero. 
Finally, let ri denote player i's discount rate.
With these definitions, we can summarize the players' 
payoffs: 
l 'i 
(9b) 
That is, player 1 gains pl (2 loses P2) if either: 
a) the target makes a prior commitment to 1 -- this 
I: (1 1 occurs with probability - F2)f1g dt; or 
b) the target makes no prior commitments but votes in
favor at T -- this occurs with probability (1 - F1 (z1(T))) 
x (1 - F2(z2(T)))p(z1(T),z2(T)). Lobbying expenditures continue only 
so long as the target is uncommitted (with probability 
We seek a Nash equilibrium for the dynamic game described 
above. N ·� A pair (u1(t,z),uz(t,z)) is a Nash equilibrium for the dynamic 
game if 
z2 
z2 
a) 
b) 
N ui(t,z) E Ui, i = 1,2; 
N ul 
1 N maximizes J (u1,u2) 
2 N g (u2 ,z2)' zi (0) = o, i = 1,2; 
c) N 2 N u2 maximizes J (u1,u2) 
2 g (u2,z2); zi (0) = o, i = 1,2. 
1 subject to zl g (ul, zl)' 
and 
1 N subject to zl g (ul,zl); 
As usual, define vi(t,z) to be the maximized value of
i N 
J (ui,uj) subject to the appropriate constraints, beginning from 
the initial point (t,z1,z2). Then at a Nash equilibrium, if one
N N exists, the pair (u1,u2) must solve [Starr and Ho (1969)]:
0 
0 
vl 
+ 
t 
v2 
+ 
t 
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(lOa) 
(lOb) 
i where L (t,z,u) denotes the integrand from i's payoff function. In 
addition, the definition of Vi(t,z) implies the terminal conditions 
v1(T, z(T)) 
v2 (T, z (T)) 
P1 (1 - Fl (z1(T)))(l - F2(z2(T)))p(z1(T),z2(T)),
-P2(1 - F1(t1(T)))(l - F2(z2(T)))p(z1(T),z2(T)).
v Example for Opposing Lobbyists 
It is extremely difficult to determine any properties of 
the Nash equilibrium without actually solving a differential game. 
Accordingly, I use the following special case for illustration: 
-Az a) Fi(z) = 1 - e 
b) p(z(T)) 1/2 
c) rl = r2 = r 
d) i g (ui,zi) ui 
1/2 
e) pl = Pz = p 
(lla) 
(llb) 
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These are basica.lly symmetry assumptions: both players 
share the same beliefs regarding the target's probability of commitment. 
If the target makes no prior commitments, then each side is equally 
likely to receive the target's vote. The players discount at the 
same rate and are equally adept at producing lobbying effort. 
Finally, we assume that the result of a commitment to player 1 is 
a direct wealth transfer of $P from player 2 to player 1. 
We will find it convenient to integrate the first term of 
J1 by parts: 
For our example, the Bellman equations are: 
0 (12a) 
(12b) 
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and the terminal conditions are 
1 V (T,z(T)) (13a) 
2 
V (T, z (T)) (13b) 
The candidate strategies in feedback form are defined by 
system: 
0 vl t + 
0 v2 t + 
The form 
suggests 
Substituting these into (12) yields the Hamilton-Jacobi 
1 2 rt /..(zl+zz) (V ) e e 
Zl, 
4 + 
2 2 rt /..(zl+z2) (V ) e e z2 
4 + 
v1 v2 e rt 
/..(zi+z2) e 
z2 z2 
2 
Pf..v2 e rt
Zz 
2 
v2 vl rt 
/..(zl+z2) e e zl zl 
2 
PAV2 e rt 
/..zl e 
Zz 
+ 2 
PAV1 e rtzl 
2 
(14a) 
(14b) 
of the terminal conditions, along with symmetry considerations, 
a solution of the form 
1 V (t,z) 
2 V (t,z) 
0 
0 
-\z2(T) -\(z1(T)+z2(T)) a(t)e + b(t)e 
The Hamilton-Jacobi system (14) reduces to 
-\z2 -\(z1+z2) Since neither e nor e are zero (for finite zi)' it 
must be that 
0, b (T)
0, a (T) P. 
System (16) has solution 
a(t) - P 
b(t) 
3 + 
I./ t E [O,T]
-2P 
exp / 2r 
Since the pair of value functions 
19 
(16b) 
(16b) 
1 V (t,z) 
2 V (t,z) 
are continuously differentiable and since they and the stategies 
i 1,2 
solve the system (13-14), by the verification theorem [Stalford 
N N and Leitmann (1973, Theorem l)], (u1,u2) as defined in (17)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, 
Thus we have proven: 
Proposition 3: There exists a symmetric Nash 
(closed-loop) 
N ui (t,z) ·[, + 
strategies. 
2P\ert 1p\2(ert -exp 2r 
It depends 
e'T) 1r 
The Nash equilibrium payoffs are 
P ____ _,2_ P--=-----
3 + \ n
2(1 - erT> ( exp
/ 2r 
) 
only on 
i 1,2 
equilibrium 
t and 
in pure 
20 
(17) 
- 2P 
3 + 
We find that the results of Proposition 1 for the 
unopposed lobbyist are immediately invalidated for the case of 
strstegic lobbyists. 
Proposition 4: The Nash equilibrium strategies may be
a) everywhere increasing in t; 
b) everywhere decreasing in t;
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c) first increasing, reaching a single peak, then decreasing 
in t. 
Proof: 
where M and D are the numerator and denominator, respectively, in 
the expression 
[3 + em(l = sgn 
N for ui; and m( t)
- P/.. 2 e rt) /2r]. 
Let us examine the function h(t) 
h .N T us, sgn u 
- e
r
m (P"- 2 e
2
rt )2 Since h 1 (t) < 0, h(t) is greatest at t 0 and 
smallest at t T. Thus: 
a) if h(T) 4 P/..
2erT o, then •N > 0 V t E [O,T) ----> u 2r 
(with uN(T) > 0) . 
b) if h(O) 3
+
exp1 P/..2 (1 ;r
erT)( (1 -
P
2/..r
2
) .::__ o, 
then uN < 0 ·N ) V t E (O,T] (with u (O) � 0 • 
c) if h(T) < O, and h(O) > 0 (this covers all remaining 
cases), then uN is first increasing, attains a single peak where 
h(t) = O, and thereafter declines. 
Thus we could observe a decreasing rate of expenditure 
on lobbying for the case of strategic lobbyists, while an unopposed 
lobbyist always spends at an increasing rate. 
Comparative statics results are summarized in Proposition 
5 and proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 5: 
N it- > 0 Vt E [O,T].
CJuN 3x- > 0 V t E [O,T] 
N 
� > 0 V t E [O,T] CJT 
N �� > 0 Vt E [O,T] (so long as T > l/r). 
It appears that an increase in any parameter is sufficient 
to generate an increase in the Nash equilibrium rate of lobbying 
expenditures. P represents the amount of the wealth transfer from 1 
to 2 in the event of the target's commitment to side 1. Thus the 
lobbyist increases its expenditures in order to obtain the larger 
wealth transfer while the counterlobby increases its expenditures 
2 2  
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in order to prevent the larger loss. Recall that l/A is the expected 
level of accumulated lobbying effort required to obtain commitment 
to each one of the sides. As A increases, this mean required effort 
decreases, so we have the result that targets with lower mean required 
effort will be more strenuously lobbied, This contrasts with the 
unopposed lobbyist case wherein an increase in A results in a 
redistribution of expenditure from the near to the distant future. 
An increase in the scheduled vote date T also results in increased
lobbying expenditure. This is in direct conflict with the result 
of Proposition 2-(iii) for the unopposed lobbyist. Finally, an 
increase in the discount rate also results in a uniform increase in 
the rate of lobbying expenditure, again in contrast to Proposition 
2-(v), which involves redistribution from the near to the 
distant future. 
Since the game discussed in this section would appear to 
be the natural extension of the model of section III, we can only 
attribute these differences to the existence of a strategic 
counterlobby. 
VI Optimality 
This game has the well-known prisoner's dilemma 
structure. For example, at the Nash equilibrium, both players are 
worse off than if they had simply saved their money and taken their 
chances at T. Unless we assume that the members of the lobbying 
organizations derive utility from spending money on a cause they 
believe in irrespective of the dollar payoffs (which may in part 
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be true), we are faced with the task of explaining why noncooperative 
lobbying occurs. One reason could be as follows: even if the two opponents 
agree on a compromise position, they have no power to enact laws or 
issue directives to enforce their decision. They must still go through 
the decision-makers who are empowered to enforce their solutions. 
These decision-makers appear to be the only agents who benefit from 
excessive lobbying behavior. Thus they have a vested interest in 
keeping the lobbies at each other's throats. This suggests that 
further modeling of the target's behavior is required. In particular, 
we would be interested in the extent to which the targets themselves 
possess the power and incentive to create and maintain such prisoner's 
dilemma games. 
VII Discussion 
This model is obviously an extreme oversimplification of 
what occurs in practice, In particular, it models only a single 
target. In reality, the commitment of a specific target may 
precipitate the commitment of many others. Thus the value of a target's 
commitment depends in part on how many others are likely to follow 
suit. Furthermore, the value of a target's commitment depends upon 
how many commitments have already been collected. For example, 
any votes over a majority may be worthless. Thus there is really 
a sequential aspect to the problem as well. The irrevocability 
assumption is contrived; the decision to renege should be part 
of the modeling of the target's equilibrium behavior, This equilibrium 
target behavior could be modeled in a Stackelberg framework, with 
the target as leader, inasmuch as the target is empowered to alter 
institutions which the populace in general must take as given, 
at least until it ousts the target. 
Since I have not explicitly modeled the target's behavior, 
it is not clear why the target could ever be expected to commit 
itself. That is, why is it not optimal for the target to extract 
maximum lobbying benefits and then simply cast its vote with the 
side which minimizes its political costs? I suggest that there 
will exist an optimal level of lobbying effort (after which the 
target ought to commit itself) because the game is repeated on 
subsequent issues. If the target is observed never to commit 
before T, then future lobbying expenditures will be reduced (as 
E[zi] is revised upward). Thus there is some tradeoff between 
current and long-term gains, suggesting that there should exist 
some reservation level of lobbying effort which triggers commit­
ment. This commitment then acts as a signal to future lobbyist� 
that the target is willing to be persuaded. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
P)
,2 (ert _ e
rT) Let D = 4 - P(l - A r and N 
= 2P(l - p)>..ert. 
i) 
ii) 
<ln* 
__ 
8N2 > ()P · PD3 
0 Vt E [O,T). 
<lu* -8N2 
;lp 
= 
3 < 0 \,/ t E [O,T). (1 - p) D 
iii) ��* = -��2 [P(l - p)>..2drTJ < 0 \,/ t E [O,T].
iv) 4 + P(l - p))..
2 (e 
�
 
e ) [ rt rT ] 
<lu* 2 (ert - e
rT) Thus sgn � = sgn 4 + P(l - p)A r 
t - t = - ln e -> A 1 � rT < r 
v) 
4r (2 • P(l - p)>.. 
<lu* Thus sgn aJ:.� = sgn g(t) where 
<lu* > So�< 
2 [ rT (t - T) _ (ert - erT)] g(t) 4t + P(l - p)A e r 2 · r 
0 as 
1 <lu* Since g(O) < 0, g(T) > 0, and g (t) > O, ar-- is firs� negative, 
becomes zero for some t E (O,T), and then is positive until T. 
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Proof of Proposition 5: 
i) 
ii) 
iv) 
Let M = 2PAert and D = 3 + em, where m(t) 
<luN 2M2 ap = ·
P D3 
[3 + em(l - m)] > 0 \,/ t E [O,T].
() N 2M2 
_l_l_=- [3 + em(l - 2m)) > 0 \,/ t E [O,T). ()).. )..D3 
· 
Let g(t) = ert(l/r - t) + erT(T - 1/r). rT Now g(O) = l/r + e (T 
> 0 (for 
Thus g(t) 
T � l/r); g(T) = 0 and 1 g (t) = -trert < 0 for t 
> 0 ii t E [O,T) and 3t + tern+ �>..2 
(t)e g 
2 > 0 
> o. 
\,/ t E 
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- 1/r) 
[O,T). 
